Drivers License For Autistic People

debt and deficit seen "by the front left" or any cons Benedict!

Os recomiendo amigos españoles esta lectura, mas well: our English friends gabachophones!, Enabling them to locate Spain on a European scale and the debate focused exclusively on the deficit that currently exists in Spain, ... Or how to confuse ends and means.

This article deserves to be read, not because he gets on Benoît Hamon, but to be a substantive anlysis of debt (debt in Europe) and the fact that this blanks solution réabordant the theme of protectionism in Europe, the output of the euro ... Not everything has to be taken in measuring or bias of the author is in the cleavage PS / Left Front, and also by the fact that Marianne is there to tap the PS, all is good to save Bayrou!.

But hey, it's not bad to ride on that side, because the margins to highlight the programs of the inacomplissement PS, we still manage Fillon and Sarkozy to cry or productivism-consumerism of the front left that does not turn the page on the production company.

Debt: Benoît Hamon did not understand anything! / (Marianne!)

Jacques Sapir

- Economist Monday, October 5, 2009 at 07:01 Read 3720 times

Jacques Sapir did not appreciate recent statements by Benoît Hamon on government debt. The director of studies at EHESS, who supported the Left Front in the European, the judge "silly" and especially "incoherent". Because Benedict Hamon on this subject is not the same when he is spokesman for the Socialist Party when it comes in as the leader of the current "A World in advance" ...

The announcement by François Fillon a budget for 2010 with the record deficit of 8.5% of GDP has provoked many reactions. Jean-Pierre Raffarin and on Canal +

, found the figure too high. He is in his traditional role and it does not surprise anyone. By cons, Benoît Hamon's statements on September 27 that the

France was "ruined" are much more surprising (1). They have been confirmed, but this is a little less surprising, with statements along the same direction of François Hollande.

Thus, the Socialists would be converted to fiscal restraint?

Coming after their conversion to liberal Europe, this would hardly be surprising if it did not introduce a dissonance in their major speeches. Let's face it: it is unlikely that the Socialists are gaining credibility in this argument, but they certainly lose one he could still hold, particularly Benoît Hamon, other arguments such as industrial policy or protectionism European (2).

Benoît Hamon is it silly? (Third)

must first take the numbers Benoît Hamon and obviously do not know, nor all those who hold a speech on catastrophic debt.

First, it is clear that France is not specifically ruined. It is even slightly below the average for the euro zone with 81.5% in 2010 against a weighted average of 83.6%. Then, the debt is not increasing faster than elsewhere in France.

Again, we see that France is about average for industrialized countries. The debt is growing much faster in the former " good students "that were the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and Spain. It is true that for the most indebted countries there was little room for maneuver (Italy, Greece and Belgium).

However, this gives only a partial picture of the problem of indebtedness. At the public debt, yet we must add the household and corporate. And then, a surprise awaits us. In 2006, France was the least indebted of all major European countries (Figure 1
below). This was due to the relatively low household debt. The two champions indebtedness were Spain and Great Britain. As the United States, with more than 240% of overall debt, although they appeared as the Olympic champions.

Looking now 2010, with calculations assuming that households are deleveraging in all countries where they are heavily in debt, and corporate debt tends to increase, there while the debt of France is slightly below that of Germany, and very much lower than that of Great Britain and Spain (Figure 2
below). It is true that these figures do not, and this is true for all countries, the total public debt. Thus, some of the accounts or debt guaranteed by the state from certain companies in the U.S., are not included in public debt. The numbers here should be understood as comparable figures but not complete.

However, the comparable difference between these figures and actual figures is roughly the same depending on the country. So is that why we use these data (3).

It is finally true that the debt structure also explains the differences between these countries and forecasts for 2010. But, all debt must be a good day (normally) paid, whether private or public. The only reality that counts is the overall indebtedness of the agents of the economy and not merely the public debt. To have forgotten this fact, such a Peyrelevade, a fire or Raymond Barre, Benoît Hamon merit, if not a dunce cap, at least that shoots him (a little) his ears.

Benoît Hamon is it silly? (2 / 3)

must now reconsider the merits of the argument. In a recession, if one wants to make the recovery, there is no alternative but to inject money, and it's called the budget deficit. Even the IS-LM model, which is to Keynes what military music is to music and academics to gourmet restaurants, shows (5). That a leader of the PS aspiring to the highest office should know.

can certainly still quibbling over how funds are distributed, finding that it was too many gifts to the rich (that's right), which are not exercising enough control over firms who will benefit from state subsidies (it is also true ...) and that the stimulus is probably not effective enough (it's still true). In short, the themes on which to criticize the government and the President are not lacking. We might also remember that our president had committed to the release mortgages, which has seen success in the U.S. with the subprime. We may terminate its management by the discourse of crisis, its effects ad never followed by transformation into real and concrete measures, its ability to present as a breakthrough micro-measures.

But the attack on budgetary drift while we are in crisis and this crisis will last is simply irresponsible. What threatens France and Europe today is deflation, not the deficit. Wanting to sing the anthem is to prepare the rods with which we will fight once in power. Because our fathers apprentices rigor of the PS will always find more to the right and still more rigorous than they.

The reason it takes is a simple budget deficit. On the one hand, and we said, we must inject money into the economy and at a time when the effects of the liquidity crisis are not fully overcome. In the field of SME / SMIs, the number of bankruptcies is already increasing (6) and social plans to be announced this fall may have a disastrous effect.

On the other hand, only the state can invest in such a situation and that while the overall investment is paralyzed. France has lagged behind in this field between other things through the fault of Europe gradually imposing its deregulation in public services (7). The period would be given to a major development plan based on transportation revitalization of the station. It can be said in the energy field, where they will understand - but a little late - that the logic of "decoupling" between producers and transport networks, which has been implemented to enforce competition will lead us to choices that are both Malthusian (so that the "blackout" repeat (8)) and ecologically unsustainable (9).

One thing that we can criticize the government's recovery plan is not to focus on public investment - the sums involved are paltry - and not have required the Commission in Brussels for a moratorium on the implementation guidelines for the competition. There was a battle that made sense and would have prepared public opinion for another policy. But perhaps it is this what we want to avoid?

short, it is clear that Benoit Hamon said something he regretted, and which also reflected his thinking probably not. For this we may well take him (a little) ... ears

Benoît Hamon is it silly? (3 / 3)

This brings us to what seems to have become the strategy of the PS. Whatever happens, it is the fault of Sarkozy and the government. It's raining? Sarko's fault! It's too hot? Sarko's fault!

Make no mistake about it on my comments. There is plenty to criticize in the policies of Sarkozy and the government. I said and I repeat. Particularly in its management the crisis in its policy of holding bombastic speeches and do nothing or to do the opposite later. We must also blame him for everything back to him and for having by his ego, undermined institutions. As for the policy of François Fillon before the outbreak of the acute phase of the crisis, it could be similar to that of Pierre Laval in the same circumstances. In seeking to weaken the social protection system in the country, he actually made the crisis more severe when it went off. Many of the measures taken in an emergency are also very questionable. Thus the "scrapping" which undoubtedly gives good results immediately, is nothing but a measure now advances a consumption which was scheduled for tomorrow. But the total consumption as it is distributed over time remains unchanged (10).

short, there's plenty articulate a real leftist critic against the government and against our President. But keep this speech "is to blame Sarko" on anything and everything will pose a formidable problem of consistency to his opponents.

They can not even understand what keeps a sense Sarkozy in power, in addition to course institutions is the inconsistency and therefore lack of credibility of the opposition. This is not marrying for a moment the discourse of discipline, even the next day to snap back to basics with a more traditional discourse, the PS out of its credibility problem.

must also understand that this problem is intrinsic to ALL social democratic parties have made their liberal turn. The SPD has paid heavily in the recent elections in Germany, not only in favor of the Left Party, which rose from 7% to 13%, but also, and more serious for the entire German left, abstention in favor of a major that allowed the right to form a majority. It is the policy of the SPD, which in his sickening own constituents, led to the victory of Angela Merkel and Liberal.

Which brings us back to the strategic problem of the PS and that of Benoit Hamon. Quite on France 2
emphatically

"France is ruined" (which he repeated three times) he has forgotten the following things:

1 - That France does is no more ruined than other countries in Europe, I showed at the beginning of this text.

2 - That the ruin of France, it is a tax policy driven by the absence (sustainability) of European compromise in the matter, a situation that exposes us to be toys fiscal policies of other countries, determined to make their tax competition watchword. In the absence of protectionist barriers against their country, we have no real ability to manage our tax system.

3 - That which ruined France, deindustrialization is primarily induced by the introduction of competition based on " least cost "between economies where the cost of training is done on very different, but where productivity converges with ours, through foreign investment (11). It is to fight against this phenomenon that we have in our first zero-rated companies and then a second time we have funded these enterprises (for reimbursement of payroll), in ultimately arriving at mas not halt the process to stop. Protectionist measures are only able to reverse this situation, what Benoit Hamon well knows, since he was in favor of these measures (12).

4 - That the ruin of France is, finally, a policy of financial nature of the economy that has submitted all of our activities to the law of the profits in the financial markets . Not only is this political ruin France, but it kills the workers, as shown by rising health care costs directly related to job strain "and as evidenced by the suicide France-Telecom. Note here that the PS, and Benoît Hamon, would have been better advised if they had filed a complaint

"endangering the lives of others"
against the CEO of this company.

These are the first political scapegoat for the ills that we know. The responsibility is shared, however, between the right and the PS, and this is probably why Benoit Hamon unable or unwilling, to keep the discourse of truth. Let us recall the disastrous policy of Jacques Delors, the then Minister of Finance François Mitterrand, followed by equally disastrous policy of Pierre Beregovoy always as Minister of Finance (peace to his ashes ...) and finally the policy of the Jospin government from 1997 2002. If there is one lesson from this story is that the left when it pursues a policy of right always ends up making the bed of the latter.

In fact, Benoît Hamon is not stupid. As spokesman of a party that has abdicated any claim to change our society, it is obliged to give the lowest demagoguery, the risk of making his own speech - the one he holds as head of the current A World Advance - completely unintelligible and inaudible. Benoît Hamon of the UMA does happen to forget what Benoît Hamon, spokesman for the Socialist Party, said? Nothing is less certain. Consistency is a key strength in politics, what we have known for ages. To have forgotten this lesson, Benoît Hamon is well worth it pulls (some) ears.

How to get out?

That said, the public debt problem well its repayment. Certainly not catastrophic in terms that we are present, Benoît Hamon to others. But it is clear that this debt is the problem of the risk of deflation, and therefore an entry in a long-term depression.

Here we must ask a question far more important than those raised by the spokesman of the PS: why the European Central Bank lends Does 1% to banks while the government has to borrow at 3.51%?

This is a scandal that is far more serious than the budget for 2010. Why the ECB does she not admit the effort made by governments to maintain activity, and she does not give them the same privileges as the banks, which are anyway, should not forget it, those responsible for the crisis in which we are immersed?

course we know the answer: the status of the ECB. This obliges the latter to fight against inflation.

Except that the financing of part of public debt by the Central Bank does not necessarily cause inflation. We know the history of Germany in 1923-24, but we forget that the German Central Bank was to finance further debt accumulated a budget deficit exceeding 30% and linked to state funding of the strike General in the Ruhr to protest against the occupation by Belgian troops, French and Italian. One could multiply examples and we would find that the hyper-inflations have each time been triggered by a severe external shock (the occupation of the Ruhr, funding for a hunter in the case of Israel, etc..). In addition, we are now much more threatened by deflation than inflation.

Under these conditions, and if we were in a world, if not perfect, at least composed of reasonable people, we could have a decision by the ECB to pay 1% or even 0%, the portion of the deficit that is (a) directly related to the crisis (the result of decreases in tax collection and recovery plans) and (b) which concerns the efforts investment made by states. This would not cover current expenses. These conditions are generalized to the second part of the deficit mentioned here, and would be restricted by cons to the duration of the crisis for the first part.

Therefore, funding for necessary action at the exit of the crisis could take place without exerting a constraint on future growth and would end the current overvaluation of the euro is so expensive that the French economy (13).

But, we know we're not in a world populated reasonable people. Past experience proves, alas, were sacrificed growth to a certain conception of the Euro zone (14). You have to remember how to ensure the triumph of reason.

One solution would be to threaten to leave the eurozone. This threat is not taken lightly by our partners, especially if accompanied by preparatory measures making possible such an output. Germany, to mention that she can not see without fear of France out of the Euro area and devalue its currency by about 20% to 25%. The impact on German foreign trade would be immediate. This should logically we avoid to resort to this extreme, and one might think that a compromise is possible on the status of the ECB.

However, this compromise will be possible only if our partners are truly convinced of our determination to leave the eurozone. So should you seriously consider this solution, even if only to avoid having to implement it.

The output of the eurozone poses are really three issues: a technical problem (printing new notes), a monetary problem (whatever the exchange rate and what convertibility), finally the problem of accumulated debt. These are serious problems, but not insoluble.

The first problem, the printing of new notes, can be resolved within six months. This is also the time that the French government should focus its negotiating partners.

The second problem is the exchange rate. It is clear that output in the euro zone must be accompanied by a devaluation of 20% to 25% to be effective. The first thing to do is to immediately reintroduce exchange controls and capital, including from the announcement of the time we give to our partners. This measure will convince them otherwise the seriousness of our commitment. If an agreement can be reached before the expiry of 6 months, what I want, it is clear that these measures will be lifted. Otherwise, they are to be maintained to stabilize the franc during both the downside and upside. For some of them, a gradual relaxation is conceivable (primarily for measures concerning the possible exchange relating to business transactions). Finally recall that the development of the practice of credit cards will
Exchange Control much more efficient than it was before. A related problem is the transformation of the bank accounts of the euro in France. We can suggest that this transformation takes place at different rates depending on the amounts. For example, if we start from the assumption that a franc worth 0.8 Euro (20% devaluation from the Euro or 25% from the new course Franc), we could have a transformation on the using a coefficient of 1.25 (or 1.25 to 1 Euro Franc) A and booklets for all popular savings accounts to the tune of 50,000 Euros. The rate could then move gradually from 1.25 to 1 for other accounts and the higher bands. Of course, this applies only to persons residing in France and, under certain conditions that remain to be determined, the French non-residents. For all residents by cons, their debt will be converted into France during 1 to 1. Thus establishing a difference between the treatment of deposits and debt will help to alleviate the debt of the poorest households are exposed and contribute to their solvency.

leaves the third problem, that of debt, which is by far the most difficult. Our debt is now denominated in euros. It can therefore only increase about the devaluation of our GDP calculated by the Franks. The solution here lies in the redemption of this debt successive annual installments, by issuing new debt in francs or in a partial default. The first of these solutions is hoped, to the extent a failure, even partial, would condemn us for some time to renounce foreign financial markets. However, since the convertibility of the franc would be limited to commercial transactions, such a renunciation would probably have less impact than you can imagine. Note that for new deficits, the rules explained above apply, and it would not issue to finance, without exception due to a particularly bad economic conditions, operating deficits through Central Bank (which would be returned to the Bank of France). This would also have the effect of requiring the State in presenting its budget to carefully distinguish what is the operation of which is investment.

There is no doubt that out of the Euro would be a difficult operation, but it is far from impossible. It would be better not to have to do it, but this remains largely suspended the decision of our partners. Provide the most bad scenarios is therefore a realistic policy. Not that one wants that outcome, but it is considered possible.

It should be noted here that if, God forbid, we had to leave the Eurozone, while the devaluation of 25% is recommended that we could afford to abandon, at least temporarily, to the adoption of a protectionist system vis-à-vis other countries in the European Union. The problem arises however still to countries outside the zone.

One can certainly argue that it would have undermined what happens in the eyes of some for longer great victory of François Mitterrand's second seven. To that one can answer that only fools who fetishize a symbol, and it is far more important to ensure the prosperity of France than clinging to a symbol. As far as I know Benoît Hamon is not a fool.

(1)
Associated Press, 29/09/2009.

(2) Agoravox
, September 30, 2009, interview with Benoît Hamon.

(3) And we shall recall here only part of the public debt of the Länder is not consolidated with the public debt Germany, the United States has extended the state guarantee for various financial firms whose debt represents about 15% of GDP in Britain's local government debt is not consolidated public debt etc ...

(4) And here, the author of this text Pleads Guilty in early 1980, helped to teach this model to students in 2nd year economics, knowing well that was very far from representing the reasoning of Keynes. But he also argues the mitigating circumstances. The professor called as Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

(5)
The Tribune, September 29, 2009.

(6) A useful on the effects of the European competition in the insurance field D. Scalera and A. Zazzaro, "The Unpleasant

Effects of Price Deregulation in the European Third-Party Motor Insurance Market: A Theoretical Framework" , The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy , vol. 7 (2007): Issue I (Contributions), Article 50 . This section may well apply to the utilities sector. (7) S. Borenstein, "The trouble with electricity markets: Understanding California's restructuring disaster »
in

Journal of Economic Perspective , vol. 16, n°1/2002, pp. 191-211. (8) J. Percebois et P. Wright, « Electricity consumers under the state and the private sector: comparing price performance of the French and UK electricity industries, 1990-2000 »
in

Utilities Policy , n°10/2001, pp. 167-179. (9) Ce que l'on appelle la consommation inter-temporelle.

(10) P. Artus, « Quels risques pèsent sur les salaries européens ? »
,

Flash-Economie No. 2006-153, April 11, 2006, IXIS, Paris. See also P. Artus, "Why trade openness seems to be unfavorable in some cases? ", lyrics Economics No. 2004-53, February 17, 2004, CDC-IXIS, Paris. (11) See interview in Agoravox of 30/09/2009.

(12) F. Cachia, "The effects of the appreciation of the Euro on the French economy"
, in

Note Synthesis INSEE, INSEE, Paris, June 20, 2008. (13) J. Bibow, "Global Imbalances, Bretton Woods II, and Euroland's Role in All This "in J.
Bibow and A. Terzi (eds.),

Euroland and the World Economy: Global Player or Global Drag? , New York (NY), Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Destiny and turbulence - Madrid.